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Communism and Intellectuals
michael david-fox
Grappling with the relationship between intellectuals and communism
after 1917 calls to mind two topics long treated as almost entirely distinct.
The ﬁrst concerns non-Soviet, generally noncommunist intellectuals
around the world and, in particular, intense twentieth-century debates
over the pro-Soviet “fellow travelers” in the decades after 1917. The second
concerns the role and place of intellectuals living and working under
communism itself as a new, postrevolutionary intelligentsia emerged.
The two topics have been divorced from one another not only because
they were studied by historians in separated ﬁelds, but because the differ-
ences between them seemed obvious. Foreign intellectuals, wooed as
sympathizers or potential allies by the organs of Soviet cultural diplomacy,
parts of the Comintern, and the party-state, were outsiders not infre-
quently distant from the workings of the secretive Soviet system. Under
Stalinism, the most pro-Soviet of them – known as fellow travelers abroad
and “friends of the Soviet Union” at home – were celebrated rather than
repressed. “Domestic” intellectuals, by contrast, were directly enmeshed
in the political, cultural, scientiﬁc, and ideological dimensions of Soviet
power during a period when the intelligentsia and culture were drastically
remade. In the most hackneyed, Cold War-era renditions of these
two topics, foreign fellow travelers were naive dupes or “useful idiots”
(an apocryphal phase attributed to Lenin), while the Soviet intellectuals
were either dissident martyrs or “hacks.”
It is the purpose of this chapter, by contrast, to hone in on a rich ﬁeld
of interactions, overlap, and parallels in the ways the new Soviet
regime approached intellectuals both domestic and foreign and, by the
same token, to identify certain common ways in which intellectuals
both subject to and distant from Soviet power approached communism.
These rare, twin juxtapositions reveal the patterns of a consequential
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twentieth-century relationship rather than the easy answers of martyrol-
ogy or demonization.
In the history of communism, intellectuals were anything but marginal,
and the ways in which foreign and domestic intellectuals were linked were
several. Most of the top Bolshevik leaders themselves emerged from
the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, and they attributed outsized
importance to intellectuals even as they and other Marxists condemned
most of them as servants of the bourgeoisie. Soviet Marxism entrenched
a class framework for analyzing the intelligentsia as a wavering “stratum”
that applied internationally as well as at home; the practices and institu-
tions the new regime innovated to attract and police nonparty specialists at
home had a major impact on the way intellectuals abroad were
approached.1 From the start, a nexus emerged between the internal and
external dimensions of the Soviet system. This internal–external nexus
ensured that both international and domestic factors, and in particular
their interaction, shaped communist agendas and approaches to intellec-
tuals. Both domestic and foreign intellectuals, in turn, shared a range of
little-analyzed commonalities in their strategies toward and interactions
with Soviet communism.
In other times and places, intellectuals have sometimes been seen as
marginal or far from the core missions of the state. Under communism,
and in the minds of party leaders, they became central. Both the determina-
tion of top Bolshevik theoreticians and politicians to create a “proletarian”
intelligentsia in the 1920s and Antonio Gramsci’s roughly contemporaneous
theory of organic intellectuals contained in his prison notebooks reﬂected the
importance the communist movement attributed to the role intellectuals
would play in a new socialist order. As a practical matter, the international
weakness and isolation of the early Soviet state heightened the importance of
foreign intellectuals.
By the time a simple class analysis of the intelligentsia as a wavering
stratum caught between the poles of the proletariat and bourgeoisie
became entrenched in the early Soviet years, communist policymakers in
practice confronted a complicated and diversiﬁed array of intellectual
groups, professions, and attitudes in their own and other countries.
What was unusual was that the concept of “intelligentsia” inherited
and reworked in the Soviet years was remarkably broad, ranging from
1 Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western
Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921–1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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composers and literary ﬁgures to engineers and scientists, and under
Stalin extending even to bureaucrats and “white-collar workers.”
This encompassing Soviet category thus united these varied groups
conceptually and in terms of many policies, while in practice intellectuals
played many roles, and hardly just those of visionaries and “thinkers.”
Heightening their importance for the Soviet party-state, they included
experts and shapers of culture in an age of “cultural revolution,” as well
as publicists and public ﬁgures who could inﬂuence the “masses” in the
wake of the international “propaganda revolution” of World War
I. The era of total war made shaping popular opinion a top priority for
states not just at home but also in other countries. The young Soviet
state, in particular, held few international trump cards other than what
we would today call its “soft power” among leftists and sympathetic
opinion-makers.
At the same time, intellectuals represented a threat. Within the Russian
Empire and well into the 1920s, the intelligentsia formed the backbone
of civic and political groups and movements. Given the overpowering
Bolshevik imperative to dismantle autonomous organizations and direct
the construction of socialism, this too provided strong incentives either to
coopt or to defeat old elites and launch the fateful project of creating a new
intelligentsia.
As a result, there quickly emerged a striking dualism in Bolshevik and
early Soviet approaches to intellectuals, an ambivalence that was very
much present to varying degrees in the history of foreign communist
parties and their personnel policies. Despite the crucial importance attrib-
uted to intellectuals by revolutionary leaders, the legacy of the workers’
movement and the habits of Marxist political thought also created
a propensity to dismiss intellectuals and cultural policy as matters less
fundamental than the reconstruction of the economic base or issues
related to mass mobilization. The result of a dualistic approach was
dualistic results: the Bolshevik Revolution directed considerable political
violence toward members of the intelligentsia from the start, yet equally
quickly moved down the path of according them very signiﬁcant
privileges.
The duplexity of the communist approach was squarely rooted in long-
standing splits within the revolutionary movement and social democracy.
The twomajor constituencies within Russian social democracy were workers
and intellectuals, and there were innumerable permutations within the
sociocultural, political, and ideological world of the revolutionary movement
michael david-fox
528
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/9951458/WORKINGFOLDER/PONS-V1/9781107092846C21.3D 529 [526–550] 25.3.2017
12:09PM
in response to this fraught cohabitation.2 There was a continuum over the
years ranging from workerist and anti-intelligentsia sentiment, on the one
side, and vozhdizm, or a de facto cult of elite, often intelligentsia leaders
and leadership, on the other. Marx had said that only the workers could
emancipate themselves, but the theoretician of this autonomywas himself an
intellectual.
Lenin’s own position might be seen as a compromise, since his famous
concept of professional revolutionary was accessible to workers and intellec-
tuals alike. On the one hand, Lenin loathed the “bourgeois” intelligentsia; on
the other, the revolutionary leader who once ﬁlled out a questionnaire about
his own occupation by writing “litterateur” ﬁrmly believed in the need for
political leadership of the masses by the interpreters of Marxism and the
necessity for building socialism with white-collar, noncommunist hands.
The ﬁrst widespread use of “old” experts by the new regime may have
been the “military specialists” in Trotsky’s Red Army in 1918, but it was
Lenin in the same year who forbade “mischief-making” around the old
Academy of Sciences after it expressed willingness to cooperate with the
red republic. Lenin also presided over the use of former factor managers,
white-collar personnel, scientists, and other “bourgeois specialists” even
during the height of anti-intelligentsia sentiment and class-discriminatory
social policies in the early Soviet years.
At the outset of the New Economic Policy (NEP), Bolshevik policy-
makers condemned spetseedstvo (specialist-baiting) and Lenin railed against
“communist conceit” toward experts, while at the same time longstanding
intelligentsia traditions of civic opposition were broken.3 Between 1922 and
1924, a new modus vivendi with the old intelligentsia was put in place.
For example, a 1924 VSNKh report commissioned on the initiative of
Felix Dzerzhinsky, the Cheka founder, who came to defend ofﬁcial yet
embattled NEP-era practices of accommodation with the specialists at the
end of his life, started with the premise that the majority of the technical
personnel in the country came from the “old technical intelligentsia.”
Written by A. Z. Gol’tsman, it explicitly rejected the derogatory class
connotations attached to “specialist” in favor of judging people by profes-
sional qualiﬁcations. At the same time, even this report followed the
orthodoxy that new “red” specialists would take their place – but not,
2 Reginald E. Zelnik (ed.), Workers and Intelligentsia in Late Imperial Russia: Realities,
Representations, Reﬂections (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1999).
3 Stuart Finkel,On the Ideological Front: The Russian Intelligentsia and the Making of the Soviet
Public Sphere (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
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however, overnight.4 Thus did practices associated with awarding scien-
tiﬁc and cultural elites material rewards and privileges become established
even as the project of creating their potential gravediggers – a new,
proletarian or socialist intelligentsia – was launched.
While Lenin railed against the rotten bourgeois intelligentsia yet found
ways to launch a specialist policy aimed at winning their services for the
new state, his lieutenant Stalin foreshadowed future features of Stalinism
with his “Tsaritsyn approach,” the civil war commissar’s 1918 combination
of harsh maneuvers against military specialists and fabricated counterrevo-
lutionary plots on the Southern Front. Stalin’s best biographers have
emphasized his congenital suspiciousness of experts and intellectuals as
manifested in this formative experience.5 But Stalin too went on to tolerate
the NEP-era modus vivendi with the specialists, even though he then pre-
sided over a great attack on specialists during the “Great Break”; by the
same token, he rehabilitated the old specialists in 1932 and created vast new
privileges for the intelligentsia during the two decades that followed, yet
purged the intelligentsia ruthlessly and, as with all elites during the Great
Terror, disproportionately.
A more convincing interpretation, therefore, is that Stalin, who as
a seminary graduate deﬁnitively belonged to the intelligentsia wing of the
party yet not its theoretical elite, reconﬁgured and expanded the fundamental
Leninist dualism toward intellectuals. Like the other Bolshevik leaders, Stalin
recognized and perhaps even overestimated their crucial importance yet saw
most as unreliable if not enemies. As a result, he was ready at once to
privilege and to repress them. Stalin did not only shape but was constrained
and inﬂuenced by the successive policies of differing periods: war commun-
ism, NEP, the “Great Break.” To be sure, after he consolidated his one-man
dictatorship in the 1930s he then demonstrated more willingness to take
extreme, unprecedented steps in both areas – privilege and repression.
As Erik van Ree has written, Stalin, himself a revolutionary intelligent who
had adopted the persona of a teacher vis-à-vis the workers, was “no Mao, no
Pol Pot: he targeted these people not because they were an intelligentsia but
because they were an intelligentsia of the wrong kind. To educate a politically
4 Discussed in N. N. Pavlova, “Repressirovannaia intelligentsia: Solovetskii izvod
(1928–1934),” in D. B. Pavlov (ed.), Repressirovannaia intelligentsia 1917–1934 gg.
(Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010), 407–13.
5 Stephen Kotkin, Stalin, vol. i, Paradoxes of Power, 1878–1928 (New York: Penguin Press,
2014), 300–07; Oleg V. Khlevniuk, Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator, trans. Nora
S. Favorov (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 55–59.
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reliable new intelligentsia was evenmore important for him than to crush the
old one.”6
As of the early 1920s, the line between foreign and domestic intellectuals
was blurred by the presence of a large emigration at the end of the civil war of
a kaleidoscopic array of cultural and intellectual ﬁgures from the Russian
Empire who appeared in Harbin, Berlin, and other European capitals such as
Belgrade. The Bolshevik leadership and the GPU in the early 1920s weremore
than a little obsessed with the Russian emigration, and their fears of Russian
émigré inﬂuence on international opinion and Soviet initiatives abroad were
heightened by the fact that the borders were not yet sealed. Some cultural
and intellectual ﬁgures who traveled abroad did not come back, and others
who had left returned. It was at this moment that the Changing Landmarks
(Smena vekh) movement caused a sensation among Russian émigrés with
their 1921 call for the Russian intelligentsia to “go to Canossa” and support the
new Soviet state. The Bolsheviks were reuniting Russia, making it a great
power on the world stage; in spite and not because of their ideology, Lenin
and the Bolsheviks were in fact pursuing Russian national missions.7
The article “Patriotica” by N. V. Ustrialov assumed a central place in Smena
vekh. The author, a right-wing Kadet disillusioned with party politics, had
been director of the press agency glorifying Aleksandr Kolchak’s White
dictatorship in Omsk. On the eve of his departure for Harbin, his movement
defeated, Ustrialov underwent a conversion to his electrifying stance in favor
of a strong Soviet state.8
Conﬂict and compromise between “reds” and experts became
a hallmark of the era. The NEP-era “carrots” of a regularized place in the
Soviet order and material incentives for the nonparty intelligentsia were
accompanied by swings of the stick: international travel policy tightened
up and a range of key ﬁgures were simply evicted. Several hundred major
intellectuals and their families considered anti-Soviet, including numerous
philosophers, religious thinkers, and civic activists, were famously expelled
from the country in 1922 on the “philosopher’s steamboat.” Civil groups
led by the old middle-left yet non-Bolshevik intelligentsia, whose activist
ethos had been heightened by total war, were either banned or coopted,
while the new university charter of 1922 put party appointees in charge.
6 Erik van Ree, “The Stalinist Self: The Case of Ioseb Jughashvili,” Kritika 11, 2 (Spring
2010), 280.
7 S. S. Chakhotin, “V Kanossu!,” in Smena vekh (Prague: Politika, 1921), 150–66.
8 N. V. Ustrialov, “Patriotica,” in Smena vekh, 59, 63.
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The ﬁrst “bourgeois” foreigners to arrive for extended periods, such as the
German scholar Otto Hoetzsch, were wooed, marking the emergence of
a new system of cultural diplomacy focused on the reception of foreign
visitors.
At this same time, the Bolsheviks met the smenovekhovtsy half-way
and launched a policy of coopting members of the Russian intelligentsia,
explicitly including those motivated to reconcile with the Soviets on
national, patriotic, and imperial grounds. In 1921, the party literary ﬁgure
N. L. Meshcheryakov greeted the Changing Landmark intellectuals as
“National-Bolsheviks” who would inevitably move closer to what he called
true Bolshevik-Communists.9 The ideas of the smenovekhovtsy were trium-
phantly propagated as well as harshly criticized in the Soviet 1920s, and the
label smenovekhovstvowas deployed in Soviet parlance far beyond the original
Smena vekh group to encompass many different types able to come to terms
with the new regime. This included a range of prominent Ukrainian émigré
intellectuals (the Ukrainian equivalent of the term was zminovikhivtsy) who
either became Sovietophiles or found an accommodation with the Bolsheviks
at a time when the “ideology of the far right came to dominate the political
thought of the Ukrainian emigration.” As a trail of Russian intelligentsia
returnees received positions during the NEP, prominent members of the
Ukrainian intellectual and political class returned to the Ukrainian SSR. These
included the renowned historian and politician Mykhailo Hrushevsky;
a section of his party, the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries; a number of
social democrats; and former members of the independent Ukrainian
People’s Republic (UNR).10
The ideological offensive of the “Great Break” after 1928 prompted an
assault on both the Russian and Ukrainian returnees, and they were particu-
larly vulnerable during the Great Terror. However, in the 1920s the prece-
dent and success of early Soviet recruitment policies toward émigré
intellectuals who were far from Bolshevism established a precedent for
ﬂexible maneuvering with ideologically distant foreign intellectuals willing
to form partnerships with communism. These included nationalists and
conservatives of various stripes in different countries, and, at key moments,
9 The foremost work of scholarship is Hilde Hardeman, Coming to Terms with the Soviet
Regime: The “Changing Signposts” Movement among Russian Émigrés in the Early 1920s
(DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994); Meshcheryakov cited on 100.
10 Christopher Gilley, The “Change of Signposts” in the Ukrainian Emigration:
A Contribution to the History of Sovietophilism in the 1920s (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag,
2009), quotation 22.
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even far-right ﬁgures of Weimar Germany’s “Eastern Orientation”who were
close to fascism.11
In the common émigré miscalculation that the new regime would
gradually moderate itself and serve either Russian, national, or great-power
interests – not to mention their own agendas – these insiders with linguistic
and political knowledge of Soviet communism in fact mirrored a response
common among a number of foreign intellectuals, who faced many more
linguistic and cultural barriers in accessing information and understanding
the Bolsheviks. For example, a number of liberals in the US ARA (American
Relief Administration) famine relief mission circa 1922 believed that
economic aid for reconstruction would lead to a stronger Russia without
Bolshevism. Later in the decade, some of them assumed pro-Soviet stances.12
Conversely, a number of Mexican intellectuals, artists, and writers, experien-
cing the maturing, compromise-ridden stages in the life cycle of their own
very different revolution begun in 1910, ﬂocked to the “ﬁrst socialist society”
with the underlying yearning to restart stalled revolutionary transformations
at home.13
If there was overlap in the calculations leading émigré intellectuals
from revolutionary Russia and foreign intellectual observers to engage
the young Soviet state, analogies can also be found between Russian
intellectuals and the non-Russian intelligentsias in the borderland regions.
A tutelary mission to enlighten and mold the masses was a distinguishing
feature of the Russian intelligentsia since the mid nineteenth century.
In the Central Asian context, the liberal reformers known as Jadids,
with their “aggressively modernist interpretation of Islam,” developed
a cult of knowledge and enlightenment hardly unfamiliar to the strong
strain of kul’turtregerstvo in the Russian intelligentsia. But as Adeeb Khalid
suggests, before 1917 the Jadids looked more to Istanbul than to
St. Petersburg. After they were radicalized by the Bolshevik Revolution,
they underwent a shift from liberal constitutionalism to the “politics of
mobilization.”
11 Michael David-Fox, “Leftists versus Nationalists in Soviet–Weimar Cultural
Diplomacy: Showcases, Fronts, and Boomerangs,” in Susan Gross Solomon (ed.),
Doing Medicine Together: Germany and Russia between the Wars (University of Toronto
Press, 2006), 103–58.
12 David Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the
Romance of Russian Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003),
ch. 6 and passim.
13 William Richardson, “‘To the World of the Future’: Mexican Visitors to the USSR,
1920–1940,” Carl Beck Papers 1002 (1993).
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Jadid intellectuals thus became central players in a cultural revolution
and Soviet war on backwardness that unfolded throughout the 1920s. Party
leaders from the center knew little about the Muslim “East,” and this
opened a major space for the cooperation of indigenous intellectuals. But
the Jadids’ cultural revolutionary project revolved around nation rather
than class and engaged a particular, “Turkestan-centered Turkism.”
In sum, their project became thoroughly intertwined with and ultimately
subordinated to Bolshevik missions, but even so maintained its own logic
and inﬂuence in the early Soviet decades, especially in Bukhara until 1924
and then in Uzbekistan.14 The history of Jadidism and Bolshevism provides
a case study of entangled modernities in the emergence of Soviet Central
Asia.
Non-Russian intelligentsias more generally became prime agents in
Soviet-sponsored “national construction.” The involvement of non-
Russian intelligentsias – whether Turkic, Slavic, or Transcaucasian – in
the broad Soviet project of cultural revolution throughout the 1920s also
held international ramiﬁcations in that decade and beyond. Domestic non-
Russian intelligentsias became involved in Soviet cultural and political
outreach directed at related nations and nationalities across Soviet borders
or in other regions of the developing world. There is an analogy here with
the major input of nonparty intellectuals in the all-union center into
the creation of Soviet culture and science, which also involved ofﬁcial
and quasi-ofﬁcial external missions. In all these instances, intellectuals
helped construct their own gilded cage and, once inside, suffered greatly,
especially in two waves of anti-intelligentsia persecution during the Great
Break and the Great Terror.
Once the Soviet order had stabilized in the 1920s, another type of
internal–external dynamic emerged as well. Communism was scientistic
and promised advanced results from rational planning and state-funded
projects, and this feature of the new regime went well beyond the realm
of ideas alone. The collapse of the tsarist state had paved the way for a wave
of postrevolutionary institution-building that included not only new types of
14 Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1998); Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and
Politics in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 56–59; and esp.
Adeeb Khalid, Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), quotations 6, 15. On the East as a key commu-
nist category in the internal–external nexus, see Masha Kirasirova, “The ‘East’ in
Bolshevik and Comintern Ideology: The Arab Section of the Communist University
of the Toilers of the East,” Kritika (forthcoming).
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institutions –most notably, scientiﬁc research institutes – but also opened the
door to previously stymied or novel methodologies and subﬁelds. When
disciplinary innovation occurred in ﬁelds that could be seen in harmony
with Soviet Marxism, it beneﬁted from declarations of support for Soviet
goals. Often, new ﬁelds or approaches were simply pushed forward by
visionaries and dreamers inspired by the revolution, and this occurred in
a wide range of medical, social science, and scientiﬁc ﬁelds. To cite only
well-known examples, these ranged from social medicine and eugenics to
more radical and utopian experiments, such as ex-Bolshevik Aleksandr
Bogdanov’s blood transfusion institute or the biologist Il’ia Ivanov’s
attempts to crossbreed humans and apes.15 At the same time, impetus
toward social engineering and the great project of creating a New Man
inspired a range of social scientists in ﬁelds such as criminology, pedagogy,
and psychology to try to ride the tiger of the new Soviet state.16 While
a signiﬁcant portion of the “old” intelligentsia went into emigration by
1920, another part of the professional and scientiﬁc intelligentsia came to
participate in the Bolshevik Revolution, with its core projects of remolding
society and creating a New Man, as either an inspiration, an opportunity,
or a bit of both.
The mushrooming new institutes and novel disciplinary conﬁgurations
created with state patronage by the Soviet scientiﬁc intelligentsia, in turn,
attracted the interest and attention of a wide variety of foreign profes-
sionals, scientists, social scientists, and cultural ﬁgures. While a number of
them joined the interwar “pilgrimage to Russia” and visited the USSR, it
was very common for those of them who viewed the USSR from afar to
combine pro-Soviet political views with an overriding personal interest in
a branch of Soviet science or culture connected to their own speciﬁc ﬁelds.
Some of them, such as the French physicist Paul Langevin or the Czech
musicologist Zdeněk Nejedlý, joined the ranks of the most ardent and
activist fellow travelers of the interwar period. Here there is an analogy
between the way the members of the Russian avant-garde, who were
“outsiders” of the late tsarist period, became “insiders” after they
15 On social medicine, see Solomon, Doing Medicine Together; on Bogdanov, see
Nikolai Krementsov, A Martian Stranded on Earth: Alexander Bogdanov, Blood
Transfusions, and Proletarian Science (University of Chicago Press, 2010); on cross-
breeding, Kirill Rossianov, “Beyond Species: Il’ya Ivanov and his Experiments on
Cross-Breeding Humans and Anthropoid Apes,” Science in Context 15, 2 (2002),
277–316.
16 Daniel Beer, Renovating Russia: The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
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supported the revolution (and took advantage of Narkompros and Soviet
state patronage). The heyday of the young Soviet avant-garde then con-
tributed to a wave of cultural-political interest in the Soviet experiment,
starting with a sensational exhibition of Soviet avant-garde art in Berlin on
Unter den Linden in 1921 and continuing through the Berlin–Moscow
cultural axis of the ﬁrst Five-Year Plan.17
On the right wing of the political spectrum, intelligentsia émigrés
from the Russian Empire contributed to the most virulent new forms of
anti-communism. Russian, Ukrainian, and Baltic anti-Bolshevism, anti-
Semitism, and right-wing nationalism stimulated by the White struggle
with the Red Army was transferred abroad via the Russian emigration,
which included ideologues and intellectuals as well as political and mili-
tary ﬁgures. In the Central European context this played a role in the rise
of fascism. To be sure, the internationalism of extreme nationalisms was
by deﬁnition limited, but circa 1920 key texts such as the notorious
Protocols of the Elders of Zion were propagated through this dynamic.18
Just as Soviet recruitment took advantage of émigré Russian nationalist
intellectuals such as the Changing Landmark group, Soviet and Comintern
operatives in certain times and circumstances courted those they conven-
tionally considered bitter enemies – right-wing nationalists and fascist
intellectuals, and in some cases before 1933, fascist intellectuals who
were or later became Nazis.
The door was opened toward this little-known communist tactic because
there was a strain of ideological fascination as well as enmity for Bolshevism
and Stalinism on the extreme right of the political spectrum in interwar
Europe. In Germany in particular, this was stimulated by the geopolitical
“Eastern Orientation” and fascination with regimented mass mobilization for
revolutionary goals. The aim on the Soviet side was not necessarily
attempted conversion, but potential “neutralization” of the new nationalist,
revolutionary intellectuals of the right.19
17 Katerina Clark,Moscow, the Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of
Soviet Culture, 1931–1941 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), ch. 1.
18 Michael Kellogg, The Russian Roots of Nazism: White Émigrés and the Making of National
Socialism, 1917–1945 (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
19 Michael David-Fox, “Annäherung der Extreme: Die UdSSR und rechtsradikalen
Intellektuellen,” Osteuropa 59, 7–8 (2009), 115–24; Michael David-Fox, “A ‘Prussian
Bolshevik’ in Stalin’s Russia: Ernst Niekisch at the Crossroads between
Communism and National Socialism,” in Michael David-Fox, Crossing Borders:
Modernity, Ideology, and Culture in Russia and the Soviet Union (University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2015), ch. 7.
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Although such openings to right-wing intellectuals were not without
controversy on the Soviet side, the ﬂexibility to undertake them at all was
enabled not only by Leninist politics, but also by Marxist-Leninist ideol-
ogy – or, more exactly, an emergent doctrinal tenet that morphed into an
early Soviet worldview. In the 1920s, as Marxism-Leninism became
entrenched, Soviet writings on the intelligentsia widely disseminated
a “class analysis” of the intelligentsia as a “wavering” stratum caught
between the two great poles of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.20
This early Soviet doctrinal cliché served several purposes. It explained
how some intellectuals could go over to the side of the working class while
others remained enemies. It also fed a marked anti-intellectualism in
communist political culture writ large that associated intellectuals with
indecisiveness and weakness. The ﬂip side of the communist on-again, off-
again accommodation with specialists was that the “wavering” of intellec-
tual Hamlets was counterposed to the steely proletarian or Bolshevik
qualities of resolute action and necessary ruthlessness.
This quasi-ofﬁcial class deﬁnition of the intelligentsia, as it was
dispersed, was internalized by important ﬁgures such as the writer and
Old Bolshevik Aleksandr Arosev, a friend of Molotov from childhood
who became head of VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations
with Foreign Countries) during the years of the Popular Front. The
stereotype of the wavering intellectual became a leitmotiv of Arosev’s
thinking on the intelligentsia in the 1920s and 1930s. His diary shows he
even applied it to himself, seeing himself as a Hamlet-like ﬁgure caught
between his cultural and political ambitions. Tellingly, however, in his
public pronouncements in the mid 1930s Arosev only contrasted the
wavering of foreign and European intellectuals to the virile, ideological
unity of the Soviet intelligentsia.21
As Soviet notions of the “Western” or “foreign intelligentsia” came into
use, they became conduits for projecting into international contexts
a number of familiar tropes applied to intellectuals at home. Stalinism ratiﬁed
20 For an example of the early Soviet debate on the intelligentsia within an emerging
Marxist-Leninist framework, see Boris Isaakovich Gorev, “Intelligentsiia, kak ekono-
micheskaia kateoriia,” in Na ideologicheskom fronte: Sbornik statei (Moscow: Gosizdat,
1923), ch. 1.
21 “Stenogramma doklada A. Ia. Aroseva, ‘O vstrechakh i besedakh s vidneishimi
predstaveiteliami zapadno-evropeiskoi intelligentsia,” 4 May 1935, in Rossiiskii
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva (RGALI), f. 631, o 14, ed. khr. 3, ll.
1–24, quotations 16, 22; Arosev, entries of 24 Sept. 1934 and 18 June 1935, in
Aleksandra Aroseva, Bez grima (Moscow: ZAO Izdatelstvo Tsentrpoligraf, 1999),
65, 70.
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a veritable cult of culture in the 1930s, in which achievements in the cultural
realm became a key part of a broader Stalinist superiority complex. With this
ofﬁcial celebration of culture and “culturedness” (kul’turnost’), mini-cults of
foreign intellectual “friends of the Soviet Union” served to appropriate the
trappings of world culture. The celebration of foreign intellectuals ranged
fromGeorge Bernard Shaw (who visited the USSR with fanfare in 1930) to the
French writer Romain Rolland (who acquired a mini-cult during his visit of
1935).
To be sure, the celebration of pro-Soviet foreign intellectuals was outdone
by even grander forms of domestic hero-worship of a pantheon of domestic
writers, scientists, and professionals such as Maxim Gorky, Ivan Pavlov,
the pedagogue Anton Makarenko, and the rocket scientist Konstantin
Tsiolkovskii.22 In the case of nonparty or “bourgeois” intellectuals – both
Soviet and foreign – narratives presented the famous intellectuals’ biography
as a teleological process of overcoming early social and political ﬂaws.
In a tendentious Russian translation of Rolland’s autobiographical essay,
for example, the French writer engaged in self-criticism of his “bourgeois
individualist” youth, but set on the correct “path” toward embracing the
Soviet Union after he overcome his paciﬁsm and bourgeois intellectual
“wavering.”23
This general Marxist-Leninist framework for understanding the intelli-
gentsia in practice became linked to speciﬁc modes of party-state informa-
tion-gathering and analysis concerning intellectuals. A general party-state
practice of political reportage, commonly applied in the international arena,
for example, was to divide any given group into three – enemies, friends,
and those in between who could be swayed either way. This conventional
triad ﬁt neatly into the class analysis of the intelligentsia as a group caught in
between.24 In the cultural diplomatic and security organs tasked with deal-
ing with foreign intellectuals, apparatchiki judged levels of friendship and
enmity with statements and publications about the USSR centrally in mind.
22 On the cults of leading Soviet intellectuals in a wide range of ﬁelds, see Sheila
Fitzpatrick, “Cultural Orthodoxies under Stalin,” in Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.),
The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1992), ch. 10. On the cult of Tsiolkovskii, see Michael G. Smith,
Rockets and Revolution: A Cultural History of Early Spaceﬂight (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2014), chs. 9–10.
23 Romen Rollan [Romain Rolland], “Moi put’ k proletarskoi revoliutsii,”
Internatsional’naia literature 3–4 (1934), 9–10.
24 For an example, see E. V. Mikhin, “Klassovaia bor’ba i nauchnye rabotniki,” Nauchnyi
rabotnik 5–6 (May–June 1930), 15–18.
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At home, they could rely on far more direct surveillance and loyalty tests.
Thus, in practice, ﬂexible and contingent classiﬁcations toward intellectuals
could be inserted into a Manichean worldview. That said, foreign and
nonparty intellectuals alike, even the most ardent of sympathizers, could
never be completely “ours.” Famously, when André Gide published a book
critical of the regime after his 1936 Soviet tour, one of the most celebrated
friends of the decade became a maligned enemy faster than the blink of
an eye.
By the late 1920s and 1930s, a range of party-state practices governing
relations with the intelligentsia had solidiﬁed. These involved the carrot as
well as the stick. Particularly in the case of utilitarian incentives, one can also
discern a distinct overlap between the treatment of foreign and domestic
intellectuals. Foreign intellectual sympathizers as well as members of
the Soviet intelligentsia were offered economic incentives as well as non-
monetary privileges. Policy toward the “bourgeois” specialists had ratiﬁed
privileged pay differentials and a scientiﬁc “star” system already in the 1920s,
and by the 1930s “intelligentsia privileges were often proudly announced.”25
For their part, foreign intellectuals were offered royalties from translations,
invitations to tour the USSR at state expense, banquets, and gifts. Other
strategies involved ﬂattery, such as exhibitions, wide distribution of the
foreigners’ works, and press coverage.
The ritualistic, highly scripted aspects of Stalinist culture accentuated these
early practices, but there is also evidence that Stalin’s own proclivities fed the
unprecedented scale of the privileges accorded the new intelligentsia elite.
In his memoirs, the editor of Izvestiia, Ivan Gronskii, recalled how Stalin
discussed preparations for Gorky’s fortieth literary jubilee: “At one of the
sessions, Stalin made a proposal: ‘Give Nizhnii Novgorod and the oblast
Gorky’s name. Rename Tverskaia Street in Moscow after him.’” Gronskii
reacted negatively, saying that this was laying it on too “thick,” but Stalin
replied: “‘That doesn’t matter. That doesn’t matter.’ Leaning over, very
quietly, he said to me: ‘He’s an ambitious man. We have to bind him to the
Party.’”26
In the 1930s, the visits of leading foreign intellectual “friends of the Soviet
Union” became grandiose state visits ﬁlled with pomp, circumstance, and
25 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times. Soviet Russia
in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 96, ch. 4 on privileges.
26 Quoted in Katerina Clark and Evgeny Dobrenko (eds.), Soviet Culture and Power:
A History in Documents, 1917–1953, trans. Marian Schwartz (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007), 87.
Communism and Intellectuals
539
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/9951458/WORKINGFOLDER/PONS-V1/9781107092846C21.3D 540 [526–550] 25.3.2017
12:09PM
meetings with the vozhd’. These Kremlin receptions, along with the galaxy of
mini-cults of cultural and scientiﬁc ﬁgures, supported the central Stalin cult in
direct ways by displaying the symbiosis of culture and power. The Stalin cult
itself gloriﬁed the man who had launched his career in the intelligentsia wing
of the party as a great Marxist theoretician and, in a trend that reached its
apogee with Stalin’s 1950 tract,Marxism and Problems of Linguistics, a scientiﬁc
genius in his own right.
Closely related to outright economic incentives for intellectuals were
broader patterns of patronage. Patron–client relations in general became
fundamental to Soviet intellectual life, because of both party-state direction
of science and culture and the norms of the political system. But it was not
just the domestic intelligentsia that had to have its own patrons in the guise of
powerful politicians and key institutions; this phenomenon, too, was
exported across state lines. A new form of transnational patronage emerged,
in which institutions of the party-state charged with cultivating foreign
intellectuals offered to favored or pro-Soviet ﬁgures such important tangible
commodities such as travel and translations, or more intangible goods such as
the political prestige or access to information that might accrue from high-
level Soviet ties. Friendship societies abroad, the ﬁrst of which was created in
Berlin in 1923 under the concealed auspices of VOKS, and which in the course
of the next decade spread to cities around the world, were one key conduit of
this transnational patronage. Soviet embassies, especially at ﬁrst in European
capitols with signiﬁcant Soviet colonies such as Berlin, Prague, Paris, and
London, became another vehicle. What is most clearly the case in the
transactions of transnational patronage in turn holds true for domestic,
Soviet phenomena: patron–client relations were shaped by institutional and
ideological rationales, and not only by personalistic favoritism, important as
that may have been.
Another avenue along which domestic and foreign intellectuals became
linked was in the innovative, indeed unique system in which the land of
socialism was showcased abroad. On-site visits became the crown jewel of
Soviet outreach to foreign intellectuals after noncommunist sympathizers
began streaming in on their own accord after the end of civil war hostilities, at
the very time the international practices of the new regime crystallized.
It soon became clear that bringing outside observers in served key functions
when it came to intellectuals. In what turned out to be a great advantage,
members of the Soviet intelligentsia alike were mobilized to meet and greet
their foreign counterparts. For example, when the American writer
Theodore Dreiser visited in 1927, it was arranged for him to hobnob with
michael david-fox
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the crème de la crème of cultural and intellectual life of the era, including the
theater director Konstantin Stanislavskii, the poet Vladimir Maiakovskii, and
the ﬁlmmaker Sergei Eisenstein. Tours were tailored to the visiting intellec-
tual’s speciﬁc ﬁeld: the American pragmatist philosopher and progressive
educational reformer John Dewey met the leading educational ofﬁcials and
theorists of the day, from Lunacharskii and Krupskaia to S. T. Shatskii and
V. N. Shul’gin. Overwhelmed by the extent to which his own theories were
embraced and ostensibly put into practice, the future chair of the purge-era
Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky
declared in 1927 that progressive pedagogy was more advanced in the USSR
than in the USA.27
Perhaps most important, the presentation of Soviet socialism became
centered on model sites that were presented as embodying the future or, in
a key conﬂation, as typical of the Soviet present. The methodology of
showing these models – which ranged from schools and institutes to prisons,
collective farms, and communes for reformed juvenile delinquents – was
termed kul’tpokaz, or cultural show. Kul’tpokaz had overlapping origins with
Socialist Realism, which in the 1930s became a pervasive ideological mode of
seeing the future in the present as well as the ofﬁcial if capacious doctrine in
literature and the arts.
Soviet intellectuals played a key role in the history of kul’tpokaz. For
one thing, they and their agendas were instrumental in displaying many
of the model sites, or founding institutions that later became presented as
models inside and outside the country. For example, the pedagogue
Anton Makarenko and the writer Maxim Gorky were both heavily
involved in the OGPU/NKVD labor communes for rehabilitating home-
less juvenile delinquents in the late 1920s, when they became a prime
stop on the itineraries of visiting intellectual dignitaries. Furthermore, the
guides and translators who were attached to the intellectual visitors
through VOKS or other Soviet institutions were versed in foreign lan-
guages and some area of culture or science, so the methodology of
cultural show was propagated by people who can be considered minor
Soviet intellectuals in their own right.
More generally, the Soviet intelligentsia was mobilized to promote
cultural ties abroad and the international image of Soviet socialism. This
took on a more coercive cast when Stalin’s Great Break of 1928–29 broke
27 David C. Engerman, “John Dewey and the Soviet Union: Pragmatism Meets
Revolution,” Modern Intellectual History 3, 1 (2006), 33–65, esp. 40–46.
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the NEP-era modus vivendi with the “bourgeois specialists” and interge-
nerational, institutional, and political in-ﬁghting reached its apogee.
As professions such as engineering were decimated by arrests, Soviet
intellectuals were pressured, for example, to sign the latest declaration
du jour and make themselves available for the reception of foreign lumin-
aries. Of course, even then such international contacts could be seen as
a privilege as well as an obligation on the Soviet side. Even in the periods of
greatest repressiveness, members of the Soviet intelligentsia were far from
mere cogs in the machine; they were highly skilled in pursuing their own
priorities.
In the Stalin period in particular, Moscow assumed an extraordinary,
unprecedented position of dominance that deeply affected cultural and
intellectual life. While Leningrad and many non-Russian cities were cultural
centers in the years between 1918 and the end of the 1920s, Moscow in the
1930s was represented as the showcase socialist city for foreigners and the
epicenter of a superior culture with global pretensions. Economic and cul-
tural hyper-centralization drew provincial and non-Russian intellectuals like
a magnet to the all-union center.28
Moscow was thus also the privileged meeting place for Soviet intellec-
tual intermediaries and their foreign intellectual interlocutors. But for
a charmed circle of leading Soviet intellectuals in the 1930s, the foreign
intellectuals were cultivated abroad, in situ. As the ﬁrst phase of the Stalin
period after 1920 signiﬁcantly tightened restrictions on international travel,
the role of these elite Soviet mediators paradoxically increased. These were
the privileged party and Soviet intellectuals, cultural ofﬁcials, journalists,
and diplomats who were able to crisscross Europe or embark for more
distant venues to shape what an entire country read on international
developments.
The successful Soviet intellectual mediator had to be able to navigate
simultaneously in two worlds: the cultural and intellectual life in the
relevant international context, on the one hand, and the pressure-cooker
of Soviet and Stalinist cultural politics and ideology, on the other.
Mediators’ close contacts with prominent Soviet sympathizers abroad
put a certain class of these ﬁgures in a special position in both the
institutions of Soviet cultural diplomacy and the extraordinarily
28 Clark, Moscow, the Fourth Rome; Mayhill Fowler, “Mikhail Bulgakov, Mykola Kulish,
and Soviet Theater: How Internal Transnationalism Remade Center and Periphery,”
Kritika 16, 2 (Spring 2015), 263–90.
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successful Comintern-based initiatives of Willi Münzenberg. Often sev-
eral such ﬁgures were attached to every major pro-Soviet intellectual
sympathizer.29
The most talented and impressive Soviet intellectuals, of course, had
their own views about politics, culture, and the ﬁgures from abroad with
whom they interacted. In the era before most of them met their
destruction in the Great Terror, a number of Stalinist Westernizers, as
they might be called, discerned a chance to bring Soviet culture close to
the leftist culture of Europe. Many Soviet intellectual mediators genu-
inely admired the writers and intellectuals they also inﬂuenced or
manipulated.30 As this suggests, Soviet cultural and intellectual elites
had their own agendas that were distinct if overlapping with those of
the political and foreign policy leadership. In pursuing them, they played
a discernible role in making the interwar Soviet Union into a global
preoccupation for intellectuals.
In non-Russian union republics, local intellectuals played a different
kind of mediating role, part of what Mayhill Fowler has called internal
transnationalism.31 They found themselves in between Moscow-based
ideologues and cultural apparatchiki, on the one hand, and their own
national audiences, on the other. In the case of Ukraine and the
construction of Soviet Ukrainian national identity, for example, Serhy
Yekelchyk has talked about both Ukrainian ideologues and intellectuals
in the Stalin era as occupying “the ambiguous position of mediator
between the Kremlin and their non-Russian constituencies.”32 Ethnic
intellectuals, as this makes clear, preserved their own cultural promi-
nence while playing a key role in the Soviet order. The international role
of non-Russian intellectuals remains to be further investigated. For
example, Masha Kirasirova has explored how Central Asians “were
29 Sophie Coeuré, “‘Comme ils disent SSSR’: Louis Aragon et l’Union soviétique dans
les années 1930,” in Jacques Girault and Bernard Lecherbonnier (eds.), Les engage-
ments d’Aragon (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997), 59–67, esp. 62–65; Leonid Maksimenkov,
“Ocherki nomenklaturnoi istorii sovetskoi literatury: Zapadnye pilgrimy
u stalinskogo prestola (Feikhtvanger i drugie),” Voprosy literatury 2 (2004), 242–91;
Voprosy literatury 3 (2004), 274–353; and Leonid Maksimenkov (ed.), Bol’shaia tenzura:
Pisateli i zhurnalisty v Strane sovetov 1917–1956 (Moscow: Materik, 2005), on Rolland
238, 300, 378–81, 389–90, 391, 411.
30 Michael David-Fox, “Stalinist Westernizer? Aleksandr Arosev’s Literary and Political
Depictions of Europe,” Slavic Review 62, 4 (Winter 2003), 733–59.
31 Fowler, “Mikhail Bulgakov, Mykola Kulish, and Soviet Theater.”
32 Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian–Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet
Historical Imagination (University of Toronto Press, 2004), 6, 12.
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recruited to produce Eastern images of Sovietness for export to the
Middle East through media and ﬁlm propaganda and, increasingly after
World War II, through physical travel abroad and managing tourism at
home.”33
***
Looking at intellectuals and communism across borders raises valuable
interpretive possibilities. But it also reveals major differences between
foreign intellectuals not directly subject to the jurisdiction of Soviet
power and Soviet intellectuals increasingly shaped by their perspectives
as insiders within the Soviet political and economic system, their proximity
to the extensive Soviet ideological and cultural establishment, and the
direct application of coercion and political violence. Intelligentsia elites
lived through three peaks of repression under Stalinism: the early 1930s, the
Great Terror, and the Zhdanov period. Even at the apex of anti-intellectual
policies and ideological xenophobia at home, the project of wooing intel-
lectuals abroad carried on.
While the domestic order was marked for the duration of the Soviet period
by a shifting oscillation between crackdowns and thaws, intellectuals inside
Soviet borders were ultimately affected even more by a long-term, linear
intensiﬁcation of institutional controls and self-censorship. The party-state
built an elaborate and unprecedentedly intrusive arsenal of soft and hard
levers that ran the gamut from political and ideological campaigns, economic
privileges and incentives, centralized cultural unions, appointments and
patronage, to the organization of institutions on the macro and micro
level. Intellectuals developed elaborate strategies to deﬂect those instruments
but at the same time engaged in self-mobilization, self-policing, lateral
surveillance, and ubiquitous appeals to authority. While the intelligentsia’s
self-image was one of a heroic force of resistance to preserve culture, it is
important to reﬂect on how intellectuals themselves were caught up in their
own repression. Finally, the history of Soviet scientiﬁc and cultural ﬁelds
suggests that the internal conﬁgurations of disciplines, the actions of their
leading ﬁgures, and the proximity of their core methodologies to Marxist-
Leninist ideology led to signiﬁcant variations affecting the professional lives
of Soviet intellectuals.
33 Masha Kirasirova, “The Eastern International: The “Domestic East” and the “Foreign
East” in Soviet–Arab Relations, 1917–1968” (PhD dissertation, New York University,
2014), xiii.
michael david-fox
544
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/9951458/WORKINGFOLDER/PONS-V1/9781107092846C21.3D 545 [526–550] 25.3.2017
12:09PM
Another dynamic speciﬁc to the internal history of the Soviet intelli-
gentsia revolves around generational conﬂict. Because of the major
breaks in political life, science, education, culture, and ideology that
occurred both around the great turning-points of 1917–18 and 1929–30,
a succession of distinct generational cohorts became central to the
history of intellectuals in the Soviet space. Speaking in the broadest
terms, those with prerevolutionary education and experience were
separated from a younger, 1920s generation, which in turn was distinct
from the rapidly promoted cadres (vydvizhentsy) of the Stalin period.
This rough, tripartite generational division held for both the nonparty
intelligentsia and the party intellectuals (Old Bolsheviks, 1920s party
Marxists, and, for lack of a more nuanced term, Stalinists) and, mutatis
mutandis, was replicated among non-Russian intellectuals in the Union
republics. For obvious reasons, the last of the three foundational
generational cohorts in the early Soviet Union had the least amount
of international experience and was least successful at brokering ties
with foreign intellectuals. The ﬁrst phase of Stalinism during the ﬁrst
Five-Year Plan and after was marked by intergenerational conﬂict
among all three groups. The importance of distinct generational cohorts
of Soviet intellectuals remained salient for decades to come.
The trajectory of non-Soviet intellectuals’ relationship to Soviet com-
munism was shaped by a very different set of dynamics. In the most
general sense, what attracted foreign intellectuals and indeed all foreign
observers in some way sympathetic to Soviet communism was the
multifaceted appeal of an alternative modernity and noncapitalist path
to the future. Without this element, for example, the new transnational
patronage would have lost most of its effectiveness for foreign intellec-
tuals. The NEP, with its domestic compromises, thus held far less appeal
to many intellectuals abroad than the repressive “socialist offensive” of
the ﬁrst Five-Year Plan. Intellectuals in other countries were affected
directly and in vastly different ways from domestic Soviet intellectuals by
the twists and turns of Soviet foreign relations with their own countries
and a succession of major conjunctural shocks, including the rise of
fascism, the Great Depression, the Terror, the Molotov–Ribbentrop
Pact, and the Grand Alliance. Speaking no less broadly, the Soviet
Union’s alternative modernity held its greatest appeal to intellectuals in
Europe and the United States in the interwar period, while after World
War II that appeal shifted to developing countries, whose elites perceived
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in the Soviet superpower a recipe for rapid, authoritarian, and non-
Western modernization.34
Despite the importance of these disjunctures between Soviet and non-
Soviet intellectuals, this chapter has identiﬁed a number of overlooked
commonalities in the relationship between Soviet communism and intellec-
tuals inside and outside the USSR. In terms of Soviet policies and attitudes, or
what might be termed intelligentsia policy, these commonalities emerged
early on in part because the new regime crystallized at a time when the
potential repatriation of émigré intellectuals blurred the line between domes-
tic and international. They emerged also because the Marxist-Leninist analy-
sis of the intelligentsia as a wavering stratum, which affected or justiﬁed
some practices of recruitment of nonproletarian, nonparty intellectuals, was
salient for intellectuals inside and outside the USSR. One can also posit that
the pragmatic political, economic, and economic integration of nonparty
“specialists” at home, however rocky that was, eased the way for the
proletarian state to woo foreign “bourgeois” intellectuals with a good dose
of ideological ﬂexibility and scarce material incentives. From the point of
view of the vast range of intellectuals who saw reason to cooperate with the
ﬁrst socialist society, attempts to link their own agendas in particular ﬁelds of
culture and science to the new regime or to beneﬁt from party-state patron-
age did not stop at the borders of the Soviet state.
All this suggests that the relationship between communism and intellec-
tuals was not a question of ideas alone – the ideological or political attraction
of Soviet communism as a system – as often portrayed in the discussion of
fellow travelers and Western “dupes.” Rather, ideas worked in tandem with
a range of material interests, speciﬁc disciplinary or cultural considerations,
the experiences of visits, and the inﬂuence of networks of mediators.
Of course, without ideological allure or political interest all other factors
would have worked much less effectively.
As this chapter has also suggested, communist attitudes toward intellec-
tuals were dualistic from the start: large doses of suspicion and hostility
toward the intelligentsia were present at every stage, but at the same time
the crucial signiﬁcance of the intelligentsia was an idée ﬁxe. Given the deep
34 Steven Marks, How Russia Shaped the Modern World: From Art to Anti-Semitism, Ballet to
Bolshevism (Princeton University Press, 2003), ch. 7. But on conﬂicts in the Soviet
relationship with intellectuals in the “global South” in the era of decolonialization,
see Constantine Katsakioris, “The Soviet–South Encounter: Tensions in the Friendship
with Afro-Asian Partners, 1945–1965,” in Patryk Babiracki and Kenyon Zimmer (eds.),
Cold War Crossings: International Travel and Exchange across the Soviet Bloc, 1940s–1960s
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 134–65.
michael david-fox
546
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/9951458/WORKINGFOLDER/PONS-V1/9781107092846C21.3D 547 [526–550] 25.3.2017
12:09PM
roots of this Janus-faced mentality, there was a logic to the resulting situation
in which the Soviet intelligentsia became at once enormously privileged and
harshly coerced.
At the end of the 1920s, the secret police’s Solovetskii Camp of Special
Designation in the far-north White Sea archipelago became the prototype
for the emergent Gulag and by far the most infamous holding ground
for repressed members of the intelligentsia. Dmitrii Likhachev, the future
academician who, decades later, supplied Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn with the
Solovki-based title for his Gulag Archipelago, worked in a philological unit
studying prisoner slang with a Russian scholar who held a doctorate from the
Sorbonne.35 In 1930, an OGPU special commission studying camp conditions
produced a three-volume report recommending greater “use” of repressed
specialists in the Gulag. Indeed, the Great Break marked one initial peak in
the creation of the so-called sharashki, or special units of arrested scientists
and engineers working on high-priority projects in relatively privileged
conditions.36
The largest single category of prisoners at Solovki in 1930, which encom-
passed the incarcerated intellectuals, were “politicals” often classiﬁed in camp
statistics as “counterrevolutionaries” (known as kaery after the acronym from
the Russian letters k-r). Of 555 prisoners at Solovki on the books as informers
in 1930 (the camp population reached 71,800 at the beginning of 1931), the
OGPU commission concluded, too few derived from intelligentsia, specialist,
and “cultured” elements. The commission therefore issued a call for more
recruitment among “counterrevolutionary authorities” (k-r avtoritetov). This
formulation, on the face of it so bizarre, signiﬁed intellectuals imprisoned for
political crimes who would have inﬂuence among the “counterrevolutionary
masses.”37 Even in the Gulag, Soviet power looked to the intelligentsia as
a crucial, inﬂuential stratum between the authorities and the people and its
members were mobilized, privileged, and used. Inside the camps, as without,
willing partners were found.38
35 Dmitrii Likhachev, “Mesto pod narami: Solovki. 1928–1931 gody”, interview in Pervoe
sentiabria (6 Nov. 1999), 5; Dmitrii Likhachev, “Iz knigi Vospominaniia,” in
M. A. Babicheva (ed.), “V Belom more krasnyi SLON”: Vospominaniia uznikov
Solovetskogo lageria osobogo naznacheniia i literatura o nem (Moscow: Pashkov Dom,
2006), 264–96.
36 Asif Siddiqi, “Scientists and Specialists in the Gulag: Life and Death in Stalin’s
Sharashka,” Kritika 16, 3 (Summer 2015), 557–88.
37 Cited in Pavlova, “Repressirovannaia intelligentsia,” 420, 434–35.
38 Here see the neglected classic by Thomas Lahusen, How Life Writes the Book: Real
Socialism and Socialist Realism in Stalin’s Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
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